





















The following text looks at the political statements of Václav Klaus in the framework of the 
given typology, aiming at determining, analysing and reviewing his main theses and 
arguments on European integration. Part of the text is devoted to the attitudes of Czechs to 
European integration, exploring whether the critical approach of Václav Klaus goes in line 
with the majority public opinion. It shows that within a given typology, Václav Klaus can be 
either labelled as a Eurosceptic or Euroreject rather than a Eurorealist. The data from the 
public opinion surveys show that the idea of Euroscepticims of the Czech population needs to 
be reconsidered.  
 
 
The Czech Republic is considered to be quite a Eurosceptic new EU member state.4  
Articulated opinions of the Czech president Václav Klaus who presents his critical remarks on 
the European integration process in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres are seen as 
one of the reasons behind such considerations. Klaus’s attitude had been formed throughout 
the 1990s and developed into a compact position in the second half of the decade.5 Since then, 
                                                 
1 The original version of this text was prepared in the framework of the project „Die Legitimität der 
europäischen Integration: Die Debatte in den alten und neuen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union“ financed 
by the Volkswagen Stiftung.  
2 Mgr. Věra Řiháčková, Ph.D. Candidate at the Charles University, Prague, research fellow at the Europeum 
Institute for European Policy  
3 Christian v. Seydlitz, M.A., Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Tübingen 
4 See (Bielasiak, 2004, p. 6-11 and p. 22) 
5 As the Czech PM, Václav Klaus signed the Association Agreement (1993) as well as the country’s application 
to the EU (1996). He perceived the Association Agreement as a marginal (comparing to the transformational 
efforts) issue and a natural step. In the same way he regarded the signature of the EU application, which he 
viewed mostly from the pragmatic point of view and first and foremost with the economic benefits in mind. See 
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he has been speaking primarily against the high level of political integration and the limits to 
national sovereignty brought about by the EU. To a large extent, his stance has been a 
determinant for the policy of the current senior government party – ODS (Civic Democrats6); 
he has remained the honorary chairman of the party after being elected the president of the 
Czech Republic.7  
 
The debate on the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe (further referred to as the 
Constitutional Treaty) gave Václav Klaus an opportunity to express his most critical remarks 
towards the EU so far.8 Unlike the campaign before the accession referendum in 2003, when 
Václav Klaus was hesitating to give a clear personal statement,9 in the case of the 
Constitutional Treaty he openly opposed the document and its ratification. He thought the 
negative outcomes regarding the referenda in France and the Netherlands were a success and 
defended his stance in a number of interviews, essays, and articles as well as by supporting 
and promoting the translations of famous West European Eurosceptics.10 The Centre for 
Economics and Politics (CEP), founded by Václav Klaus in 1998, served him frequently as a 
platform for carrying out various Eurosceptic events.11 Several times, Klaus’s views triggered 
critical response from the European Parliament and the Commission. The most vigorous 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Interview (in Czech) with Klaus, Václav for MF Dnes daily about our EU membership, December 19, 2001, 
http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=LRy0JgKrBlAX). After the political developments in the country 
in 1996 – 7 and the transition of the ODS to the role of the opposition in 1998, the issue of EU accession talks 
became a matter of political disputes with the senior government party (ČSSD) (Václav Klaus himself 
considered the negative – in his view - result of the accession talks as a by-product of political developments in 
1996-7). The complexity and way of conduct of the accession talks, which according to some significantly 
contributed to increasing Euroscepticism in the acceding countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Harmsen, 
Spiering, 2004) most probably influenced the shaping of the Czech President’s attitudes towards European 
Integration process and to the constitutional treaty; another factor was probably also the shift in the ODS and 
Václav Klaus’s discourse from (neo) liberal towards conservative, slightly coloured by nationalism. In this 
period, Václav Klaus was not alone with his attitudes in the ODS towards the EU – a group of young ODS 
politicians who got promoted to the senior party posts thanks to the so called “Sarajevo coup” shared the 
Eurosceptic views, too. The most significant names are Jan Zahradil, who elaborated, together with Miloslav 
Bednář, Petr Plecitý and Petr Adrián, the text “Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism“, which served as the 
background paper for the ODS ideas conferences in April 2001 (http://www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-
manifest.pdf).     
6 See (Hudalla, 1996, p. 126)  
7 Elected on February 28, 2003. 
8 Well known is his proclamation: „I am allegedly to criticise the constitutional treaty; it is not correct, I refuse it 
completely”, see (Rovná, Šlosarčík, Váška, Weiss, Kasáková, 2006, p. 8). 
9 Unlike some ODS members (Ivan Langer, Martin Říman), Václav Klaus did not oppose the EU accession but 
declined to endorse the “yes” campaign. According to some, he did not vote “yes” in the accession referendum. 
See (Four Years of the Non-partisan President Klaus, Hospodářské noviny, February 28, 2006, 
http://hn.ihned.cz/index.php?s1=5&s2=0&s3=0&s4=0&s5=0&s6=0&m=d&article[id]=20540470). 
10 He wrote a preface to the publication “Řekněme své ano nebo ne Evropské ústavě“ (Let’s say yes or no to the 
European Constitution), by the Irish critic of the EU Anthony Coughlan. Another example is his chairmanship of 
the workshop where the translation of the book by Christopher Booker and Richard North „The Great 
Deception”, with the participation of Christopher Booker was presented.  
11 CEP is a partisan think-tank. It was founded after ODS left the government in 1997.  
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dispute took place in April 2005; Klaus claimed an offence to his person and function was 
done and demanded unsuccessfully a meeting with then EP President Josep Borell.12 German 
and Spanish MEPs, Jo Leinen (SPD, PES) and Alejo Vidal Quadras (PP, EPP-ED, then and 
current Vice-president of the European Parliament) were accused of offending Václav Klaus 
by publishing a declaration stating that Klaus consciously used incorrect information during 
his campaign against the Constitutional Treaty.  
In January 2007, Jo Leinen (MEP) again interfered with the Czech debate when stating that 
according to his opinion Václav Klaus was leading the Czech Republic into isolation.13 
Criticism of the president’s position concerning the European constitutional treaty also started 
to emerge from Czech politicians.14 
 
The notion of Euroscepticism or Euroscepsis is perceived with pejorative connotation both in 
political and scientific debate. Euroscepsis is not considered to a be rational critique or 
contribution to discussion but is regarded instead as a system of anti-European persuasive 
arguments, which can be operationalized and measured but starting from different 
assumptions, but it is difficult to challenge it or succeed with a counterargument.15 A 
Eurosceptic places him or her a priori out of the main political or scientific discourse; 
therefore, labeling someone as a Eurosceptic is also sometimes used for discrediting the 
critics of European integration.16 Observing formulations of Eurosceptic theses from a neutral 
point of view, besides the typology of Eurosceptic forms of argumentation17, one can 
distinguish three different forms of discourse: political Euroscepsis (or party Euroscepsis), 
i.e. the sceptical statements of politicians, with Václav Klaus being a good example of such a 
                                                 
12 See (Klaus fordert von Borrell Distanzierung, FAZ, April  25, 2005, p. 6) 
13 During the period of negotiations on the coalition government led by ODS (June 2006-January 2007), the 
voice of Václav Klaus was perceived abroad as a decisive factor for the future Czech position towards the 
constitutional treaty. Jo Leinen´s interference - a MEP from Germany, who is considered to be a leftist federalist, 
had a rather unfortunate impact in the Czech milieu. The responses to his interventions boosted one of the 
specific features of the Czech debate – anti-German resentments calling attention to the historical connotations. 
See, for example, reaction of Czech MEP, Vladimír Železný, expressed in the open letter to the president of the 
European Parliament from February 5, 2007: „… given her painful historical experience, our country and its 
public is very sensitive towards patronizing judgments and arrogant advice coming from the German 
representatives. I am surprised by such an arrogant assault on the head of state of another country, by the lack of 
elementary manners and empathy for historical reminiscences, which can be triggered by such a sermonizing and 
protectoral statements made in German and by a German politician”. 
(http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=dVdyxsfJqNz1)    
14 See, for example, the letter by members of the political party SNK-ED from April 2005, published on the 
website of the Delegation of the European Commission in the Czech Republic (http://www.evropska-
unie.cz/cz/article.asp?id=3487&page=1). 
15 See (Schröder, 2003, p. 2); (Dauderstädt, 1998) 
16 Representatives of these views themselves complain about it, for example Miloslav Bednář. 
17 See (Brusis, 2003, p. 8-10); (Sorensen, 2006, p. 3-7)  
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form; secondly the public Euroscepsis which is closely linked to the previous form of 
discourse (articulated within the common public space, for instance in the media, so it can be 
expressed by journalists, etc.); and finally the scientific Euroscepsis, examples of which are 
present in the Czech Republic as well, e.g. in the works of the philosopher Miloslav Bednář.18 
This threefold typology is contradictory to the typologies of argumentation critical to 
integration; in these the different argumentation layers can be identified in every form of 
discourse, with scientific discourse requiring even more complicated taxonomy due to its 
complexity.19 
 
In the Czech milieu, the notions of Eurorealism and Euroscepsis are rather confused and their 
dividing lines rather blurred.20 For distinguishing these two terms, a two-dimensional 
conceptual map is used in this paper to explore the attitudes of the different political subjects 
towards European integration (Kopecký, 2004). The model operates with diffuse and specific 
support to the European integration process; diffuse support being support for general ideas of 
European integration (underlying the European integration), specific support means support 
for general practice of European integration (EU as it is developing).21 A Eurosceptic is thus 
defined as a supporter of general ideas of European integration who is, on the other hand, 
sceptical about the EU being the best system/way to comply with these ideas. A Eurorealist 
corresponds within this typology with a Europragmatist, who can be defined as someone 
neither supporting the general ideas of European integration, nor necessarily opposing them, 
but as someone who often supports particular developments of the EU for purely pragmatic 
reasons. Two other categories of this schema include the Euroenthusiast, who supports both 
the general ideas of the European integration and how they are or soon will be embodied by 
the EU, and the Euroreject, who resents both the general ideas and the way they are being 





                                                 
18 (Bednář, 2003) 
19 (Schimmelfennig, 2006) 
20 One of the main reasons is that ODS, as the only democratic political party critical towards the EU, prefers the 
Eurorealist label. 
21 See (Kopecký, 2004, p. 231). The typology is originally used for distinguishing parties’ positions towards the 
EU.  
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Source: (Kopecký, 2004, p. 231) 
 
In the light of this typology, the political discourse of Václav Klaus will be examined further; 
aiming at determining and analysing Klaus’s main theses and arguments on the European 
integration. The second question deals with the possible link between the attitudes of the 
Czech public on European integration and Klaus’s discourse. Is his extreme position in line 
with the Czech public opinion? Using the selected typology, it seems that Václav Klaus can 
be labelled a Eurosceptic or Euroreject; he does not fit into the definition of Eurorealist. The 
data extracted from the public opinion polls show that the perception of the Czech public 
being rather Eurosceptic needs to be reconsidered and modified.      
 
Argumentation of Václav Klaus and its critique 
 
Klaus’s main theses on European integration, EU development, and the Constitutional 
Treaty22 can be summarized in the following way: 
 
1. European integration deviated from its original goal, which is economic deregulation 
and liberalisation, and since then (the process started roughly with the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty), there has been embracing harmonisation, homogenisation, and 
political integration in all areas. European integration is undermining competitiveness 
of the Member States, trying to impose on them an inappropriate model of social-
market economy (or welfare state).23 
 
2. Klaus explains such development by employing arguments evoking an neo-
functionalist approach, especially the political and cultivated spill-over effect. He talks 
about a close elite within the Member States who is driving European integration and 
                                                 
22 The main objections by Václav Klaus towards the Constitutional Treaty were summed-up and included in the 
so-called “Klaus’s Ten Commandments on the Constitutional Treaty” published in many dailies; (See, for 
example  http://zpravy.idnes.cz/nazory.asp?r=nazory&c=A050301_112111_nazory_mhk, March 2005).  
23 See (Klaus, Václav, Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, April 25, 2006); (Klaus, 2006) 
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benefits from it; this elite is thus striving for the isolation of the decision-making and 
policy-making in the EU of any democratic and external influence.24 
 
3. Constitutional Treaty adoption would have brought about further and unacceptable 
sovereignty pooling and Member States sovereignty restrictions. The decision-making 
process would have shifted further towards the qualified majority voting system and 
new powers would have been transferred to the EU in the new domains. Moreover, the 
European Union would have become a state in all its “fundamental features“.25 
Watering down the European countries into “provinces and regions“ would have been 
another effect of the Constitutional Treaty, aiming at the gradual weakening and 
retreat of the nation state and simultaneous rise of “post-governmental“ totality of 
particular elites, profiting from European integration.26 
 
4. Václav Klaus advocates the thesis of social legitimacy; supranational governance 
through the EU is not legitimate because there is no European nation or demos; 
democratisation of the EU through strengthening the European Parliament is thus 
impossible.27 
 
Martin Brusis28 classifies the argumentation of Václav Klaus as liberal-conservative 
Euroscepsis. The European Union is criticised for its non-liberal character, its bureaucracy, 
red tape, and restrictive regulations.29 Such an account seems to correspond well with the core 
of Klaus’s arguments. Due to his economic background, Klaus supports the liberal idea of 
minimal state.30 In his eyes, the EU represents an unviable third way how to establish a social-
market economy and welfare state in Europe. There are two fundamental limits in his 
argumentation: Klaus designs aninaccurate dichotomy (“there are only two ways”31) – either 
the “market economy without attribute” or the social-market economy, allegedly followed by 
most Europeans.32 Inaccuracy of drawing such a dichotomy makes the author inconsistent in 
his statements as far as this part of his argumentation is concerned. For example, in an 
                                                 
24 Ibid  
25 See (Coughlan, 2005, p. 13) 
26 Ibid   
27 See (Ich habe Angst um Europa, FAZ, March, 2005, p. 5); (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 20) 
28 (Brusis, 2003) 
29 See (Brusis, 2003, p. 8) 
30 See (Dauderstädt, 2005, p. 52-53) 
31 (Klaus, 2006) 
32 See (Evropský půvab a šarm, Euro, 51/2004)  
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interview for Focus weekly33, he said: “There is no way how to create a “social” economy; it 
does not mean I ignore the social issues in the economy. I advocate a market economy with 
reasonable and rational social policy; social policy that would not be a part of the market 
economy but its complement”.34 Secondly, such a dichotomy does not correspond with the 
real development of the European integration and the welfare state in the EU Member States. 
The European Union is not a model for a uniform welfare state but rather for liberal policy of 
the single market (although not yet accomplished), which is exactly what Václav Klaus calls 
for. The attempts to integrate the social areas meet with strong opposition as the Member 
States decide on their social systems. Unlike his other statements, Klaus’s liberal vision would 
be backed by many in this regard; advocating the Scandinavian social democratic model has 
gradually gone out of fashion in the European debate. Klaus’s observations do not correspond 
with the real situation of the welfare state in Europe. Also the Constitutional Treaty, criticized 
by Klaus for “attempting to accelerate and deepen European integration”35, would not have 
brought any substantial change in terms of social policy.36 Indeed, the first part of the treaty 
mentioned the economy with social aspects; however, the same formulation can be found in 
the previous treaties. At the rhetoric level, the document harbours declarations and definition 
of goals related to the social area but the actual possibility to enforce such a declaration and 
goals by the EU would have been minimal. At the practical level (competences, activities, 
procedures), the Constitutional Treaty assigned the EU only with supporting and coordination 
activities in this domain; while unanimity was retained for legislation adoption. The question 
of social rights, stipulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which constituted the second 
part of the treaty, and their enforcement, remains to be discussed. The practical impact of the 
Charter was in fact limited by two factors: despite its binding character (having become the 
second part of the Constitutional Treaty), the stipulated rights are binding only with regard to 
EU law (already respecting fundamental rights to a large extent), so the Member States would 
have not been obliged to comply with them in case of “purely domestic situations” (though 
the distinction may often be difficult to discern). The second important limiting factor is that 
the social rights were declared (being criticised from Europe’s competitiveness standpoint) as 
                                                 
33 Interview with Focus posted in Czech on May 27, 2005 on the president’s official website, 
http://www.hrad.cz/cms/cz/prezident_cr/klaus_projevy/2327.shtml. 
34 Václav Klaus was not applying completely the market economy without attributes when being the Czech PM 
and he was even respecting some social policy settings inherited from the communist regime.   
35 See (Interview for Focus weekly, May 27 2005, posted on the president’s official websites, 
http://www.hrad.cz/cms/cz/prezident_cr/klaus_projevy/2327.shtml) 
36 French socialists even thought the Constitutional Treaty was too “liberal”. 
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“principles”; binding in principle (as a general element for elaboration of EU law or 
interpretation tool) but not judicially enforceable.37   
 
As far as the second argument is concerned, Václav Klaus advocates downsizing the 
supranational elements of European integration; he criticises the absence of political clashes 
and the lack of control at the supranational level.  He calls for abolishing the “second face” of 
Europe which, unlike the first face – the liberal one (“Europe as a free area”) – embodies “the 
need of unification, harmonisation, regulation, control, and prefabrications of various 
kinds”38, and which dominates since Jacques Delors became the President of the European 
Commission. Strengthening the intergovernmental aspects of the European integration is his 
recipe for turning Europe into a free area and for the return to “good old democracy and 
politics“. However, the particular proposals on how to strengthen the EU´s intergovernmental 
aspects, while ensuring that Member States respect their commitments, are not being stated. 
Klaus does not offer a solution how to preserve the functioning single market without 
employing some regulation, harmonisation and common legal framework. He rather often 
resorts to defamation of his foes, both during the public debates and in his articles, in which 
he criticises mostly the “Europeists“ and Brussels officials who he accuses of promoting 
“apolitical post-democracy“.39 This position of his, which embraces also argument number 
three listed above, could be labelled as “Westphalian conservatism“.40 To strengthen the role 
of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process rather than the power of the 
European Parliament would be the expected suggestion of such criticisms of the lack of 
legitimacy at the supranational level.41 However, for the time being, Klaus has not been 
advocating such a position. Instead, he offered a new way of organizing European cooperation 
                                                 
37 See (Argumentář ke Smlouvě o ústavě pro Evropu, 2005, p. 34)  
38 See (Interview with Václav Klaus for MF Dnes daily about Czech membership in the EU, December 19, 2001, 
http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=LRy0JgKrBlAX) 
39 “…Hence, their (Europeists) brazen defence of post-democracy and their complacent smile over obsolete and 
out of date advocates of good old democracy and good old “political politics”. Since they are far from citizens 
(and they like that) and with their “macro-view opera-glass” (this is my expression from 1960s designating the 
central planners) they do not see the citizens and do not reach them directly, they need some groups and entities 
they can deal with on a large scale (in order to follow them blindly or complicate their life). That is why they like 
corporatist concept of social dialogue, and that is why they want big business and big trade unions, that is why 
they want Galbraith´s model of balance of powers (at the macro level, not the market functioning at the micro 
level). Since they do not want to be accountable to citizens, they like talking to various NGOs, which give them 
– they hope so at least – legitimacy they lack and “the voice of the people”, even though such people is weird.  
Europeism is a categorical way of being dependant on new things – would-be progressive, neither retrograde, 
nor traditional nor conservative. This is why it puts up with feminism, homosexualism, multiculturalism and 
with other similar attitudes that dismantle long standing European cultural-civilisation basis.“ (Klaus, 2006) 
40 (Schimmelfennig, 1996) 
41 See, for example, Jens-Peter Bonde and his proposition “Europe of Democracies“. 
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– the so-called Organisation of European States42, which would work as a standard 
international organisation on an intergovernmental base. Recently, he pointed out that his idea 
of the Organisation of European States was rather conceived as an attempt to attract attention, 
a conscious overstatement and discussion trick meant to provoke reactions.43 
 
The third argument of Václav Klaus underlines the fact that the ongoing European integration 
process is threatening national sovereignty and that the EU is becoming a “superstate”, as he 
coined the term during the Constitutional Treaty debate.44 He often refers to the presence of 
external attributes of a state, which had been in fact designed and implemented long before 
the Constitutional Treaty.45  
 
The first complicating factor of such an argument is that one cannot apply strictly the standard 
political sciences terms and concepts related to the nation-state to the EU. The EU is a sui 
generis entity that displays some features of a federal structure (Euro, powers of the European 
Central Bank, the principle of supremacy of the EU law, the European Court of Justice), but 
one can dispute the pertinence of these “state attributes“. The important feature differentiating 
the Constitutional Treaty from the constitutions of the Members States is that the EU cannot 
decide on the range of its competences. The EU is allowed to act only within the limits of its 
powers assigned (transferred) to it by the Member States; it cannot act and negotiate in the 
areas where it was not empowered to do so. The EU respects the political and constitutional 
structures of the Member States, including the system of decentralisation and local 
government. Such setting rules out any attempt to harmonise constitutional systems of the 
Member States (e.g. unification of electoral systems for parliamentary elections) or 
interference with the internal regional structure (e.g. obligatory strengthening of regions´ 
powers vis-à-vis the central government). Furthermore, EU citizens46 remain above all the 
citizens of their countries; their European citizenship has not a state character and is founded 
                                                 
42 See below  
43 See (Žádné ničení planety nevidím a nikdy jsem ani neviděl, Interview with Václav Klaus, Hospodářské 
noviny daily, February 9, 2007, http://ihned.cz/1--23103405-000000_print-31) 
44 In Klaus discourse, this argumentation level has been weakening, having been replaced by reference to the 
relation between individual and supranational entity, replacing nation-state. “For the last centuries, the usual 
European model has been the “citizen-state“, which allowed for the democracy and civil rights in our continent 
to emerge. This model should now succumb to another one – relation “individual-supranational body“, which 
cannot secure democracy and civil rights because it is leading to post-democracy and human rights. It is an 
absolutely different model of social organisation and political system from what we are used to.“ (Klaus, Václav, 
Nalejme si čistého vína ohledně evropské ústavy, MF Dnes daily, January 22, 2007) 
45 Supremacy of the EU law, for example  
46 Václav Klaus said in an interview for MF Dnes daily (December 19, 2001) that he was not looking forward to 
the EU citizenship and that he was hoping he would always be the citizen of the Czech Republic. 
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on the citizenship of the Member States that decide on their citizenship award criteria. The 
Constitutional Treaty did not specify the borders of the EU either; the Union is not a state 
with a territory. Moreover, the treaty enabled a state, for the first time in the EU´s history, to 
quit the EU under the article I-60.47 Therefore, it is questionable whether the Constitutional 
Treaty, had it come into effect, would have established ”top-down managed, regulated and 
coordinated Europe, in which the historically created nation-state would not have been the 
elementary unit but it would be a supranational European organisation48”. 
 
Whereas Klaus does not enjoy much support of his stance that the Constitutional Treaty 
constitutes a European state, the claim of the absence of a European nation (article 4 of the 
above-mentioned argumentation) is shared by many. It is debatable though whether a 
European demos is a necessary precondition for democracy. Critique of the absence of a 
European nation, the so-called thesis of social legitimacy, is the main type of criticism, mainly 
within the scientific discourse, aiming at the lack of legitimacy of EU. According to the 
supporters of this theory, legitimate governance requires a collective identity, a demos, or a 
nation, without which the EU legitimacy cannot be boosted, not even by parliamentarisation.49 
Václav Klaus follows exactly this line of argumentation against the theses of input legitimacy, 
which demand strengthening of the role of the European Parliament: “For democracy and 
parliamentary democracy, we need a demos, a nation, and we do not have it in Europe. I 
cannot imagine that a European nation will emerge in the future. (…) There is no demos in 
Europe. One can see it on a daily basis when looking at the way the European Parliament 
works. It is not a question of its weak powers, as it is often said; enhancing its powers cannot 
compensate the absence of a demos.“50 
 
Critics of an absence of a European nation or demos justify their thesis by referring to the 
necessity of minimal socio-cultural and sometimes ethnical homogeneity. This requirement is, 
in their view, accommodated fully by the nation-state, which is often considered as the only 
                                                 
47 As far as the other state attributes are concerned, the EU has no army of its own. When the rapid reaction 
forces will be finally formed, their deployment will have to be approved by all Member States anyway (it is 
difficult to imagine that deployment of the federal army would be blocked by one federate state). The EU does 
not levy taxes (the EU budget amounts of 1.1% of GDP of the whole EU territory); the right to levy taxes is a 
definition feature of each state. Tax systems of the Member States are different from each other and any EU 
measure in this area must be approved by unanimity, even according the Constitutional Treaty. 
48 See (Klaus, Václav, Nalejme si čistého vína ohledně evropské ústavy, MF Dnes daily, January 22, 2007) 
49 See (Kielmansegg, 1996, p. 53); (Scharpf, 1998, p. 7). 
50 See (Ich habe Angst um Europa, FAZ, March 15, 2005, p. 5) 
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legitimate form of political governance and an ideal of democratic theory.51 Klaus agrees the 
nation-state, as a model contrary to the supranational political integration, is a guarantee of 
democratic and legitimate governance.52  
 
Klaus shares two fundamental problems with the advocates of the social legitimacy thesis: the 
critics of European integration, building on the social legitimacy thesis, usually only condemn 
further deepening of the process by transfer of competences, but they accept the status quo of 
the integration. Václav Klaus accepts the integration in its current state, too, but he is strongly 
against the Constitutional Treaty, which he sees as a dangerous step forward. Regardless the 
above-mentioned arguments that the Constitutional Treaty does not imply far-reaching 
changes (as Václav Klaus asserts – some of the most bizarre changes, from his point of view, 
are already part of the current treaties, others are wrongly interpreted), it is problematic that 
the social legitimacy thesis does not allow for fine distinction of legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of integration. As long as this argument is used for criticising the European integration, 
it ought to lead to rejection of all forms of supranational political governance and stand for 
complete re-nationalisation of competences. One has to admit that Václav Klaus sometimes 
articulates a demand for far-reaching re-nationalisation; in this context, he hints at the 
Maastricht Treaty as the ideal state of play he would like to re-install but even then, his 
argument is inconsistent. Those who insist on social legitimacy cannot accept a far-reaching 
integration at the same time; even if we talk about the state of play before the Amsterdam 
Treaty, or after the Treaty of Nice. From the social legitimacy perspective, unless there is a 
European nation, legitimate governance can exist only within the (nation) state.       
 
Secondly, the requirement of socio-cultural homogeneity aims at criticising the lack of 
legitimacy and the democratic deficit but it is being justified exclusively on the basis of the 
theory of stability. The theoretical thesis of stability is a decisive argument in this regard, as it 
pleads for democracy with relatively homogenous nations because such democracy is more 
stable, its decision-making procedures are more efficient and its policy outcomes are 
acceptable for a wider majority. Václav Klaus usually employs democratic-functional 
                                                 
51 See (Kielmansegg, 1996, p. 54); (Isensee, 1989, p. 708); (Weiler, 1995, p. 12-16)  
52 “It is dangerous that Europe is turning away from democracy and liberty. I cannot conceive a democratic 
society without the state having a tie with a nation (or several nations). I do not hint at “ethnical pure” nation 
state, it is not my preoccupation. Democracy needs to be based in the state, otherwise we are in post-democracy. 
The European Union is a kind of post-democratic institution in my opinion.“ (Ich habe Angst um Europa, FAZ, 
March 15, 2005, p. 5.); (Braun, 2006, p. 9) 
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arguments as well.53 As most advocates of the social legitimacy thesis, he does not justify the 
shift from a theoretical perspective of stability to the perspective of legitimacy theory. Yet, 
the stability of the political system cannot be considered equal to legitimacy. Stability is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for legitimacy – stable political system is not 
legitimate due to its stability; for the close link of these two terms a well-founded argument 
needs to be presented.  
 
What makes Klaus’s European policy specific is that his views, articulated in his publications, 
are not only meant as politician’s statements but aspire evidently for a certain theoretical 
significance as well. Considering this, the main problem of his critique of European 
supranationalism and centralism, resembling socialism, and also of the illusion of global 
governance,54 is his method, namely his categorical statements and in some cases also a 
conscious ignoring of reasoning. The part of Klaus’s critique of European integration, which 
could be regarded as theoretically trustworthy and embraceable easily by scientific support is 
the social legitimacy thesis. The possibility to link to this argumentation stream is, however, 
hindered by Klaus’s deviation from the social legitimacy reasoning by refusing 
communitarism categorically; communitarism is considered to be the best way to vindicate 
social legitimacy.55 Communitarism is the main candidate for such a normative justification 
but Václav Klaus, surprisingly, criticizes communitarism together with supranationalism as an 
ideology, which causes a legitimacy deficit in the EU.56 We can conclude that Klaus’s social 
legitimacy thesis is both inconsistent and lacks reasoning. Václav Klaus does not offer 
arguments for the thesis, which if followed consistently would subsequently force him to 
refuse any form of governance beyond the nation-state level, not only the recent EU 
development.  
 
Václav Klaus statements on the future EU development vary from a proposal to establish a 
new international organisation on a strictly intergovernmental basis, the so-called 
Organisation of European States, to a solution which would allow for blocking the “creepy 
unification” by well-defined division of competences between the Community and the 
                                                 
53 See (Klaus, 2006)  
54 See for instance the dispute over the issue of global warming (Vývoz revoluce se nezdařil, Euro weekly, 
13/2007, p. 48 and elsewhere) 
55 See (Walkenhorst, 1999, p. 31 and 266-268) 
56 “Today’s communitarism in Europe and/or supranationalism are for me - and for many in Europe, dangerously 
linked with democratic deficit and post-democracy.” See (Die heutigen Probleme der europäischen Integration, 
Speech of Václav Klaus in Rede im Management Center in Innsbruck (February 24, 2006), German version of 
president’s official website, February 27, 2006, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=tVUmsIqkeDfn)  
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Member states; i.e. communitarian, shared and exclusive competences of the Member States. 
Such an optimal division would have to be envisaged for a long-term and it could not draw on 
the Constitutional Treaty proposals; Member States maximum level of sovereignty would 
have to be kept in accordance with the traditional Westphalian notion of the term 
(sovereignty). The new document would have to be based on intergovernmental negotiations; 
no bodies like Convention on the Future of Europe could be involved. The idea of the 
Organisation of European States, disputed by its author recently by being called rather a 
rhetorical overstatement aiming at attracting attention to the main argument (strengthening the 
intergovernmental principle), was elaborated elsewhere.  In the recent Klaus´ statements, 
these two arguments are in fact merging. 
 
Václav Klaus´ discourse is bound to the sovereignty term. He rejects any further 
strengthening of supranational institutions as it results in national sovereignty and identity 
weakening. The nation-state is the largest thinkable entity, which is able to accommodate 
various identities by virtue of the citizens´ loyalty to this entity; only nation-state institutions 
have the legitimacy to decide on the future development of society. This principle or way of 
loyalty construction cannot be transferred to the supranational level. Overall, the need to 
retain the nation-state sovereignty is placed above the gains resulting from pooling 
sovereignty at the supranational level.57 Klaus’s opinions are often compared to the 
argumentation of the British Conservatives, who also follow the sovereignty and identity-
based discourse. Particularly, they can find common ground in their views on the 
Constitutional Treaty, EU finality, and future EU enlargements. On the other hand, the current 
development in the British Conservative party is not seen by Klaus with much sympathy.58 
Klaus’s argumentation on sovereignty and EU bureaucracy, which aims to create a state-
featured supranational entity, meets with that of the French “sovereignist” Philippe de 
Villiers.59 Also the traditionally sovereignty-based Danish Euroscepticism60 is close to 
Klaus’s argumentation; the similarities can be found between his proposal and that of Danish 
Eurosceptic Jens-Peter Bonde61 who suggested creating a “Europe of democracies”62. Jens-
                                                 
57 (Sørensen, 2006) 
58 With the new leadership of David Cameron, Václav Klaus sees the British Conservatives as ”going green” and 
shifting towards the political centre. See for instance (Klaus se pustil do ODS kvůli spoléhání na přeběhlíky, 
Novinky.cz, January 7, 2007, http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/klaus-se-pustil-do-ods-kvuli-spolehani-na-
prebehliky_105890_sg3d0.html). The discourse of the British Conservatives differs from Klaus’s namely on the 
environmental issue, particularly global warming, and on social elements in the market economy.  
59 Chairman of the French Mouvement pour la France 
60 (Sørensen, 2006) 
61 Elected MEP (since 1979) for June Movement, Danish Eurosceptic party.  
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Peter Bonde argues for members of national parliaments to elect members of the European 
Commission in order to underline the legitimacy of the national institutions. However, 
concrete proposal like this can be hardly found in Klaus’s statements and works; he rather 
follows the method of counter-arguing the drafted solutions.  
 
Public Opinion in the Czech Republic 
 
Although the Czechs are believed to be Eurosceptics, the public opinion polls undertaken 
regularly in EU Member States (Eurobarometer) show a slightly different picture. In the last 
ten years, the overall support for the integration process in the EU peaked around the time of 
the ten new countries accession in May 200463, and then lowered again,64 reaching the level of 
55 per cent support in spring 2006.65 The declared EU support in the Czech Republic copied 
this pattern; like in the rest of the EU, the support dropped after the 2004 enlargement but 
reached a higher number in 2006 than that of 2004.66 The Czech Republic scores just under 
the European average and is quite far away from the figures of traditional Eurosceptic 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Austria, or Sweden display; in these countries the 
level of EU support does not exceed 40 per cent.67 Another survey, indicating the perception 
of benefits resulting from EU membership, shows that the Czech Republic is even above the 
EU average.68 Therefore Czechs cannot be labelled Eurosceptics; the number of those who 
reject the EU in these surveys (11%) scores under the EU-average (16%).69 The Czech 
Republic has also not experienced the sharp post-accession drop of membership support 
recorded in the 1990´s in Sweden, Finland, and Austria where it decreased from 80– 90 per 
cent below 40 per cent after they joined the EU.70 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
62 (Bonde, 2002)  
63 The most significant (8%) increase between two surveys of the Eurobarometer (taking place every 6 months) 
was recorded in the autumn 2004 when 56% citizens of the EU-25 perceived European integration as positive. 
Such a support was recorded only in 1995. The highest figure ever was recorded in 1991 (72%) and has been 
dropping throughout the 1990´s, reaching under 50% in the second half of the 1990´s. At the end of the decade it 
ranged from 48 to 54%. See (Eurobarometer 62, p. 66; Eurobarometer 52, p. 25)  
64 It went down to 50% in autumn 2005. See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 51) 
65 See (Eurobarometer 65, p. 9) 
66 After the accession, the EU support level decreased to 45% in the Czech Republic. Currently, it reaches 52%,  
51% respectively. See (Eurobarometer 65, p. 11; Eurobarometer 66, p. 3)  
67 See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 51; Eurobarometer 65, p. 24). 
68 62% of respondents think the membership in the EU brings benefits. The EU25 average is 54%. 
69 See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 54)  
70 See (Dauderstädt, 2005, p. 1)  
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However, two reservations can be brought up in this regard: the share of undecided 
respondents who neither support nor refuse European integration is still substantive in the 
Czech Republic.71 Furthermore, only a low percentage of respondents feels positive about a 
European identity;72 but this result should not be automatically explained as EU refusal.73 
Even though the above mentioned figures cannot be interpreted as unreserved support for the 
EU and the integration process, the recent data for the Czech Republic show that the number 
of Eurosceptics is relatively low. The Czechs see the political situation in the EU distinctively 
more positively than the EU average and also more favourably than the developments in their 
domestic political scene.74 
 
In his foreword to the Czech translation of Irish Eurosceptic Anthony Coughlan’s essay from 
April 2005 as well as at the events supporting the release of this publication, Václav Klaus 
heavily criticised the draft Constitutional Treaty and stated clearly he was against a 
referendum on the issue in the Czech Republic.75 Klaus’s campaign for a clear No to the 
Constitutional Treaty started already in March 2005 when the Czech dailies published the so 
called “Klaus’s Ten Commandments on European Constitution” where he articulated his 
reservations to the draft76 and it peaked in May 2005 by organising number of events 
mentioned elsewhere.77 Even though his critique of the ratification process and the 
Constitutional Treaty itself continues, the campaign culminated in the spring and summer 
months of 2005. How did the campaign impact the Czechs´ opinion on the Constitutional 
Treaty? It is necessary to mention that Václav Klaus is the most trusted politician in the 
country according to opinion polls78, and that he is even more trusted that his predecessor 
Václav Havel.79 According to Eurobarometer, in parallel with the negative outcome of the 
                                                 
71 See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 52) 
72 The Czechs are the second last in this sense (the last are the Brittons). Only 10% of Czechs feel European, 
49% do not feel this way. See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 43); (Pollack, 2004, p. 35) 
73 As some media put it  
74 (Eurobarometer 65 and 66) Also the surveys polling for trust in state and EU institutions prove it. In the 
spring, autumn 2006 respectively, 60%, 62% respectively of Czech respondents rather trusted EU institutions 
(EU average 48%, 45% respectively), the level of trust in the national government reaches about half of this 
support, national parliament and the political parties scored yet even lower. The level of support to the EU 
developing into the political union may serve as another indicator. In autumn 2006, 69% of the Czech citizens 
supported it.  
75 For details on the ratification debate in the Czech Republic see (Král, 2005). 
76 See above 
77 The press conference took place during the book launch in April 2005. CEP seminar “What would the 
European Constitution change?“ took place on May 15, 2005.    
78 In February 2007 Václav Klaus´ support reached the record level of 73%. See (CVVM, Důvěra k vrcholným 
politikům, February 2007)  
79 Václav Havel´s popularity had varied from 50 to 60% since 1999; in September 2003 it dropped to 45%  See 
(CVVM, Důvěra ústavním institucím, February, 2003) 
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French and Dutch referenda (May 29,  June 1, 2005), the level of support to the Constitutional 
Treaty80 in the EU slightly increased between spring and autumn 2005.81 In the same period, 
the general support for adoption of an EU constitutional document dropped in the Czech 
Republic reaching 10 per cent below the then EU average. According to three surveys of the 
Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) covering the period in question (February – June 
2005), the following development occurred: 51 per cent supported the general idea of an 
European constitution in February 2005, 51 per cent in April 2005 and 43 per cent in June 
2005. The number of undecided remained at 24 per cent. 65 per cent of respondents supported 
the approval of the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum. The turnout at such referendum 
would, according to these surveys, reach 55–60 per cent. In case a referendum took place, 56 
per cent would vote Yes in February 2005, 58 per cent in April 2005 and 41 per cent in June 
2005. In June 2005, the number of respondents who would vote for the Constitutional Treaty 
decreased significantly; also  the number of respondents rejecting the treaty increased by 8 per 
cent (21%, 26% and 34% opposing the treaty adoption in the given period). In comparison to 
the results of the survey from April 2005 the number of undecided respondents increased 
from 15 to 25 per cent in June.82  
 
This pattern follows partly the dynamic of the Václav Klaus campaign even though the April 
survey still recorded favourable results for the Constitutional Treaty if submitted to a 
referendum. The June decline can be explained at least by two factors; firstly, by the negative 
outcome of the French and the Dutch referenda, secondly, by Klaus’s campaign. However, the 
results of Eurobarometer 66 from autumn 2006 show that the number of Czechs supporting 
the Constitutional Treaty increased in the last six months by about 8 per cent. In total, the 
Constitutional Treaty is supported by 50 per cent of respondents, 30 per cent is against and 20 
per cent of respondents remain undecided.83 With his ongoing activities in the framework of 
the debate against the Constitutional Treaty adoption, it seems that Václav Klaus’s campaign 
experienced either a short term success or that other factors including the outcome of the two 
referenda played a more important role as far as public opinion polls are concerned and at the 
given time worked in synergy with Klaus’s campaign. It is evident that the Czechs neither 
reject the process of European integration, nor the Constitutional Treaty.   
                                                 
80 It rather concerned the support for the general idea of a European Constitutional document, not the specific 
proposal. See (Eurobarometer 64, p. 122)  
81 From 61 to 63% (Eurobarometer 64)  
82 These data include the respondents who declared they would take part in the referendum only.   
83 The set of questions on the Constitutional Treaty was carried out only in the Member States where the 




In the given typology of the four attitudes towards European integration and the EU, based on 
his statements and their changes, Václav Klaus can be identified as a Eurosceptic. He cannot 
be labelled as a Eurorealist since he rejects the current development of the EU embodied by 
the Constitutional Treaty seeing no advantages and pragmatic gains for the Czech Republic 
from a nation-state point of view.84 Klaus does not argue on the pragmatic discourse basis, but 
starts from ideological (sovereignty) positions. Looking at some of his statements, the Czech 
President oscillates between Eurosceptic and Euroreject views, but the latter category is less 
frequent. Though he declares that consistency is the virtue of his statements, this is not always 
so. That can be ascribed, first, to the strong dichotomies and parallels he constructs and 
articulates in the debate and which are consequently hard to defend; and, secondly, since he is 
primarily a politician, to a certain disagreement with his strong views amongst the ODS 
electorate and within the ODS itself.  
 
As far as the second question is concerned, based on the presented statistics, Czech do not 
seem to reject either the process of European integration or the Constitutional Treaty. The 
campaign Václav Klaus carried out against the Constitutional Treaty adoption in the Czech 
Republic peaked in the spring and summer of 2005 and displayed a short-term impact on the 
level of citizens´ support of the document. However, it seems it was successful mainly due to 
other contributing factors, especially the negative outcome of the French and the Dutch 






                                                 
84 “If the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified, I imagine flourishing future of the European Union; and that is my 
Eurooptimism. The European Union and its people need as few as possible of such documents for their happy 
and successful lives. So I think nothing will happen really. It is not true the essential harm will be done. Not 
really. I know it is a fashionable cliché in European circles. A great cyclist Romano Prodi uses his famous cyclo-
parallel: if you ride a bicycle, you cannot stop padding even for a second, because if you stop padding, you fall 
down. I consider this to be totally entrenching and impertinent comparison. The European Union is not a bicycle. 
It is not necessary to treadle all the time and keep producing one such document after another. Nothing would 
happen in Europe without it.“ (Record (shortened) of the press conference organised in connection to the launch 
of the publication Let’s say our yes or no to the European Constitution by Anthony Coughlan with the foreword 
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